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Approved For Release 2006/01/30: CIA-RDP83M00171R002100100013-0 INTELLIGENCE ISSUES FOR EARLY REVIEW

BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

There are a number of issues associated with satellite collection of intelligence that warrant early and thorough review by the new administration. Seven generic categories of issues are discussed in turn below: Launch Strategies, Robustness, Surge Capacity, Survivability, Defense versus National Systems, the Changing Collection Environment, and Budgetary Concerns.

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the Shuttle versus	<u>Expendable</u>	<u>Launch Vehicles</u>	(ELV) has no	t been ade-						
quately resolved.										

Launch Strategies: The issue of launching satellites via

- Robustness: Intelligence capabilities have been referred to as the "fourth leg" of the TRIAD. Executive, legislative, and military leaders have become accustomed to daily and in some instances hourly service consisting of accurate and timely indications and warning intelligence information. The concept of robustness deals with the ability of the Intelligence Community to consistently provide needed intelligence regardless of natural, hostile, or technological events or malfunctions that otherwise would disrupt its vital mission. Robustness can be achieved in a number of ways. Depth and diversity are two examples. Depth can be achieved by planning for backup satellites, either on orbit or ready for launch, that fill in for lost or degraded assests. Diversity can be achieved by collecting the same or equivalent information by different and unrelated collection systems thereby hedging against loss or failure of one of the systems. Much remains to be done to achieve balanced insurance against unanticipated failure of collection systems.

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	satellites.		1				

- Defense versus National Systems: The defense versus national systems issue is related to but transcends the narrower issue of survivability. There is a clear and growing trend toward respective parochialism within the defense and intelligence communities. The recent creation of the Defense Recconnaisance Support Program is one example. The mission of the DRSP seems to be to procure and operate intelligence satellites tailored specifically to Department of Defense needs. The functions of many of these systems will be identical to those provided by Intelligence Community assets. The change of administrations offers a timely opportunity to reassess this trend toward divergent consumer tailored specialization and to determine whether the trend should be encouraged, altered, or abated. There may be potential benefits in terms of robustness, capacity, and survivability. There also may be potential costs in terms of competitiveness, management control, redundancy, and expense. The extent and nature of benefits and costs should be clearly identified and weighed to arrive at a coherent and consistent policy that meets the reasonable needs of all consumers.
- technological advances of the Soviet Union have substantially altered the dynamics of the collection environment. The rapidity with which the target environment changes is accelerating. At the same time, it is taking longer and longer to field new systems for collection. It is not at all inconceivable that during the five to seven, ten or more years required to deploy a new system that the collection environ-

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ment could change enough to diminish or even negate the utility of the system. There is currently no explicit or formal mechanism within the Community to track the changing environment and identify programmatic implications. Increased emphasis on longer range planning and the establishment of program review milestones are two potential ways of resolving the problem.

 Budgetary Concerns: There have been many changes and improvements in the Intelligence Community budget process. The centralized resource management function has considerably improved and smoothed the budget review process. The improvements in process have not been accompanied by improvements in our knowledge of and ability to assess budget content. Specifically, we know very little about the preparation of budget submission packages and even less about how monies are actually spent after the budget is approved. We do know of instances where budget package costs are "padded" by as much as three or four hundred percent. We also know of instances where millions of dollars approved for one purpose are spent for another. There are undoubtedly many valid reasons for this situation, not the least of which is providing program managers with much needed flexibility in exercising their responsibilities. However, not knowing how money is spent reduces the value of a centralized budget process. The problems are associated with the transition from the decentralized "streamlined management" process of the past towards something akin to the DoD system acquisition process. Currently, we have neither.

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